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CONSTRAINING THE STATUTORY PRESIDENT 
KATHRYN E. KOVACS* 
ABSTRACT 
When agencies make decisions that are binding on the public, they must 
provide public notice, accept and consider public comments, and provide 
explanations for their final decisions. Their actions are then subject to 
judicial review to ensure that they acted within the scope of their authority 
and the decision was not arbitrary or capricious.  
The President, however, is not subject to such constraints, even when 
exercising purely statutory authority, i.e., acting as the “Statutory 
President.” That autonomy is due to the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Franklin v. Massachusetts that the President is not an “agency” under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Thanks to Franklin, the President 
exercises delegated authority to make policy decisions that have enormous 
implications for the public without the public involvement, transparency, 
deliberation, and political and judicial accountability that we demand when 
agencies make such decisions.  
This Article is the first to take Franklin v. Massachusetts head on. It 
demonstrates that the Court’s 1992 holding conflicts with the plain 
language and history of the APA; it explains the flaws in the Court’s 
constitutional analysis; and it presents the normative case for treating the 
Statutory President like any other agency.  
Having shown that Franklin was wrong, this Article sketches a new 
model for treating the Statutory President like an “agency” under the APA. 
It concludes by explaining how both the process and outcome of Trump v. 
Hawaii, in which the Supreme Court upheld the President’s order barring 
immigration from certain Muslim-majority nations, would have been 
different had the President been subject to the APA. 
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of Wisconsin and the faculty colloquium at Rutgers Law School in Newark. ©Kathryn E. Kovacs 2020. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Congress is the primary policymaker in the United States government, 
but it often delegates authority to make binding decisions to the President.1 
 













The Supreme Court observed in 1936 that nearly every volume of the U.S. 
Statutes contained a statute authorizing the President to take particular 
actions.2 Congress has delegated authority to the President to take action in 
wartime, in other emergencies,3 and “in the name of national security.”4 The 
President also acts as Congress’s delegate when taking certain actions with 
respect to immigration,5 trade,6 and federally owned lands,7 among many 
others. 
Kevin Stack dubbed the President when acting pursuant to statutory 
authority “the statutory president.” 8  As Colin Diver explained, “[t]he 
President acts as delegate when he carries out specific operational 
responsibilities conferred upon him or his office by statute.”9 When acting 
as Congress’s statutory delegate, “the President occupies a position quite 
similar to that of any other administrative officer in that his legal sanction 
to carry out those responsibilities is derived solely from the enacted law.”10 
Unlike an administrative agency, however, the Statutory President is not 
subject to the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA).11  
The APA codified a monumental compromise.12 It was an extraordinary 
moment of deliberative democracy, following years of debate between 
Congress, dozens of federal agencies, the American Bar Association, and 
other interested parties.13 The Act essentially legitimated the administrative 
state through process and judicial review. The Supreme Court and 
congressional conservatives accepted the new reality that statutes would 
delegate congressional authority to administrative agencies. They gave their 
 
2. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 324 (1936). 
3. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 748 n.182 
(2008); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2072 (2005). 
4. Amy L. Stein, A Statutory National Security President, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1183, 1193 (2018). 
5. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2018); Adam B. Cox 
& Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 511–19 (2009). 
6. See generally Kevin C. Kennedy, Presidential Authority Under Section 337, Section 301, 
and the Escape Clause: The Case for Less Discretion, 20 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 127, 129 (1987) (focusing 
“on the legislative wisdom of Congress in delegating discretionary authority to the President in the 
international trade field”). 
7. See, e.g., Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 12(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2018); Antiquities 
Act § 2, 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2018). 
8. Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 542 (2005) [hereinafter 
Stack, Statutory President]. The President’s actions taken pursuant to constitutional authority or 
statutory authority delegated to another federal officer are beyond the scope of this Article. I refer to the 
President when acting pursuant to statutory authority as the “Statutory President.” 
9. Colin S. Diver, Commentary, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 519, 521 (1987). 
10. Id. at 522; see also Stack, Statutory President, supra note 8, at 542. 
11. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 551–706 (2018)); see also Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992). 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 197–200, 248. 
13. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. L.J. 
1207, 1223–27 (2015) [hereinafter Kovacs, Superstatute Theory]. 











approval on the condition that the exercise of such delegated power would 
be subject to procedural constraints and judicial review.14  That bargain 
permeated the APA, which has since become the constitution for the 
administrative state. 15  Thus, when federal government agencies make 
binding decisions, they must satisfy the APA’s procedural requirements, 
and their decisions are subject to judicial review under the APA. 
The Supreme Court held in Franklin v. Massachusetts, however, that the 
President is not an “agency” under the APA.16  Therefore, the Statutory 
President’s actions are not subject to the APA’s procedural requirements or 
judicial review provisions.17 For example, when Donald Trump assumed 
the presidency, he issued a series of orders limiting immigration from 
certain Muslim-majority nations pursuant to his authority under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).18 Unlike an agency, he did not 
publish a proposed order, solicit and consider public input, or even explain 
his decision fully.19 The President made his decision in a black box, with 
little deliberation and no transparency.  
Judicial review of the Statutory President’s actions is available but is 
constrained significantly. When the Supreme Court reviewed President 
Trump’s final immigration order in Trump v. Hawaii, it decided that the 
President made the finding the INA required: that allowing the specified 
people to enter the country “would be detrimental to the interests of the 
United States.”20 But the Court did not decide whether that finding was 
reasonable and consistent with the record. 21  In other words, the Court 
limited its inquiry to determining that the President had acted within the 
scope of the statutory delegation; it did not determine whether the 
President’s order was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of the discretion 
Congress granted by statute, as it would have if the order had come from an 
agency.22  
 
14. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 447– 
48 (1987); David S. Tatel, Remarks, The Administrative Process and the Rule of Environmental Law, 
34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2010). 
15. See Kovacs, Superstatute Theory, supra note 13, at 1208. 
16. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800–01. 
17. See Stack, Statutory President, supra note 8, at 552 (“[T]here are almost no legally 
enforceable procedural requirements that the president must satisfy before issuing (or repealing) an 
executive order or other presidential directive.”). 
18. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403–06 (2018). 
19. Cf. id. at 2409 (dismissing as “questionable” the premise that the President must explain his 
findings “with sufficient detail to enable judicial review” (citing Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 
(1988))). 
20. Id. at 2408 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2018)). 
21. Id. at 2409. 












Unilateral presidential action is not a new phenomenon.23 In recent years, 
though, presidents increasingly have exercised statutory authority without 
following the APA’s procedural mandates and without full judicial 
review.24 President Obama, for example, issued Executive Orders relying 
on delegated authority to prohibit the import of jade and rubies from 
Burma,25 prohibit federal employees from texting while driving on the job,26 
and block the property of individuals deemed to have contributed to the 
conflict in Somalia.27 He also used statutory power to create twenty-nine 
national monuments 28  and declare twelve national emergencies. 29  He 
redirected up to $70 million to meet “unexpected urgent refugee and 
migration needs,”30 determined that it was in the national interest to admit 
up to 110,000 refugees in fiscal year 2017,31 and entered into the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement.32 
President Trump exercised statutorily delegated powers to withdraw 
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,33 block all property of the 
Government of Venezuela,34 incentivize domestic production of rare earth 
metals,35 impose a twenty-five percent duty on imported steel,36 regulate the 
acquisition and use of technology from foreign adversaries, 37  sequester 
agency appropriations across the board,38 cap the admission of refugees for 
2020 at 18,000 people,39 bar the immigration of people who do not have 
health insurance,40 bar Europeans from traveling to the U.S.,41 and redirect 
 
23. PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE 
DIRECT ACTION 20 (2d ed. 2014) (“Rule by presidential decree has been the subject of serious 
controversy since the administration of George Washington, and the debates continue.”). 
24. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking and the Rise of the Unitary Executive, 70 
ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 560–62 (2018) [hereinafter Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking].  
25. Exec. Order No. 13,651, 78 Fed. Reg. 48,793 (Aug. 6, 2013). 
26. Exec. Order No. 13,513, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,225 (Oct. 1, 2009). 
27. Exec. Order No. 13,536, 75 Fed. Reg. 19,869 (Apr. 12, 2010). 
28. CAROL HARDY VINCENT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41330, NATIONAL MONUMENTS AND 
THE ANTIQUITIES ACT 2 (2018). 
29. L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-505, NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 12 
(2020). 
30. Presidential Determination No. 2016–05, 81 Fed. Reg. 68,925 (Jan. 13, 2016).  
31. Presidential Determination No. 2016–13, 81 Fed. Reg. 70,315 (Sept. 28, 2016). 
32. Notice of Intention to Enter into the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 80 Fed. Reg. 
69,561 (Nov. 5, 2015). 
33. Memorandum on Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017). 
34. Exec. Order No. 13,884, 84 Fed. Reg. 38,843 (Aug. 5, 2019). 
35. Presidential Determination No. 2019–20, 84 Fed. Reg. 35,975 (July 22, 2019); see also 50 
U.S.C. § 4533. 
36. Proclamation No. 9894, 84 Fed. Reg. 23,987 (May 19, 2019). 
37. Exec. Order No. 13,873, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689 (May 15, 2019). 
38. Sequestration Order for Fiscal Year 2020, 84 Fed. Reg. 10,401 (Mar. 18, 2019). 
39. Presidential Determination No. 2020–04, 84 Fed. Reg. 65,903 (Nov. 1, 2019).  
40. Proclamation No. 9945, 84 Fed. Reg. 53,991 (Oct. 4, 2019).  
41. Proclamation No. 9993, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,045 (Mar. 11, 2020). 











billions of dollars appropriated for military construction to building a wall 
between the U.S. and Mexico.42  
Despite these developments, scholars take Franklin’s holding as a 
given,43 and those who address presidential administration tend to focus on 
judicial review.44 But Franklin’s analysis was flawed, and there is far more 
to the APA than judicial review. As Kevin Stack observed, “[p]rocedure 
provides a check on the potential abuses of statutory delegations, and its 
absence, particularly when the president is involved, may raise a concern 
about the arbitrary exercise of power.”45 Yet, Stack advocated elsewhere for 
a limited form of judicial review for the Statutory President, and he 
proposed no procedural requirements.46 
This Article is the first to take Franklin head on.47 It argues that Franklin 
was wrong and that the Statutory President should be subject to the APA’s 
procedural and judicial review provisions. A President who acts pursuant to 
a congressional delegation of authority should be subject to the same 
constraints as any other statutory delegate. In the words of Douglas Adams, 
“If it looks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, we have at least to consider 
the possibility that we have a small aquatic bird of the family Anatidæ on 
 
42. Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019); see also Leo Shane III, White 
House Promises Using Military Funds to Build Trump’s Border Wall Won’t Hurt Force Readiness, 
MILITARYTIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/02/15/ 
white-house-promises-using-military-funds-to-build-trumps-border-wall-wont-hurt-force-readiness/ [ht 
tps://perma.cc/GMD4-458K]; cf. Jacey Fortin, Trump Mentions a Wall in Colorado, Then Says He Was 
Kidding, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/24/us/trump-wall-colorado.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/S3GA-3GJC]. 
43. David M. Driesen, Judicial Review of Executive Orders’ Rationality, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1013, 
1016–17, 1036, 1040, 1058 (2018); Lisa Manheim & Kathryn A. Watts, Reviewing Presidential Orders, 
86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1747, 1778, 1799 (2019); Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2223 (2018); Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 VAND. L. REV. 
825, 831 & n.19 (2019); Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 1612, 1617 (1997); Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory 
Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1173 (2009) [hereinafter Stack, Reviewability]; Stack, Statutory 
President, supra note 8, at 560–61; Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in 
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 753 n.236 (2007). But see Bernard Schwartz, 
“Apotheosis of Mediocrity”? The Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 141, 
170–71 (1994). 
44. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President’s Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. 
REV. 1 (1982); Driesen, supra note 43; Alan Morrison, Presidential Actions Should Be Subject to 
Administrative Procedure Act Review, in RETHINKING ADMIN LAW: FROM APA TO Z 17, 21 (2019), http 
s://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Rethinking-Admin-Law-From-APA-to-Z.pdf; Stack, 
Reviewability, supra note 43.  
45. Stack, Statutory President, supra note 8, at 591.  
46. Stack, Reviewability, supra note 43, at 1177, 1199. 
47. But see Kathryn E. Kovacs, Trump v. Hawaii: A Run of the Mill Administrative Law Case, 
YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (May 3, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/trump-v-hawaii-a-run-of-
the-mill-administrative-law-case-by-kathryn-e-kovacs/ [https://perma.cc/N2E3-U9RH] (arguing that 
Franklin should be overturned); Morrison, supra note 44, at 17–18 (arguing that Franklin should be 












our hands.”48 If the President looks like an agency and acts like an agency, 
they might be an agency.49 Even if they are not actually an agency, perhaps 
they should be treated like one.50 
Like any agency, the Statutory President should be constrained both 
procedurally and judicially. Nicholas Bagley correctly criticized 
administrative law’s fetish with procedure. 51  On the other hand, Chris 
Walker is also correct that administrative law is over-reliant on judicial 
review: “it is a mistake to fixate on courts.”52 Both procedure and judicial 
review are critical to constraining the Statutory President effectively. 
No doubt, Lisa Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh also are correct that 
“presidential control is more complex than scholars generally have 
acknowledged.”53 Members of the Office of Management and Budget and 
others in the Executive Office of the President certainly wield considerable 
influence in decisionmaking. Thus, Nina Mendelson appropriately 
cautioned that “references to the President ought to include ‘his immediate 
policy advisors in OMB and the White House.’”54 Nonetheless, the specific 
question of whether the Statutory President is an agency under the APA 
requires an answer. Whether other parts of the Executive Office of the 
President are agencies raises separate issues that require separate 
treatment.55 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I tells the story of Franklin v. 
Massachusetts and describes its fallout. Because the case concerned the 
decennial census, the schedule in the Supreme Court was tight. The 
Supreme Court decided the case in only two months and with inadequate 
briefing on the question of whether the President is an “agency” under the 
 
48. DOUGLAS ADAMS, DIRK GENTLY’S HOLISTIC DETECTIVE AGENCY 270 (1987). 
49. I use “they” as a singular pronoun in this Article. “The use of genderneutral pronouns such 
as ‘they, them, and theirs’ to describe an individual person is growing in acceptance.” Jessica A. Clarke, 
They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 896 (2019); see also Words We’re Watching: Singular 
‘They’, MERRIAM-WEBSTER: WORDS AT PLAY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/sing 
ular-nonbinary-they [https://perma.cc/J32M-J969]; Jessica Bennett, She’s the Next President. Wait, Did 
You Read That Right?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/us/politics/w 
oman-president-she-her.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage [https://perm 
a.cc/F4J3-8U7Z]. 
50. Cf. Partnerships: Ways-Means Chairman Rostenkowski Says Nature of MLP Deals Will 
Determine Tax Treatment, [1987] DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 181, at G-6 (Sept. 21, 1987) (“In other 
words, if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and sounds like a duck, it ought to be taxed as a duck.”). 
51. Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345 (2019). 
52. Christopher Walker, Administrative Law Without Courts, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1620, 1624 
(2018). 
53. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A 
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 69 (2006). 
54. Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1147 (2010) (quoting Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 2245, 2338 (2001)). 
55. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (2018) (provision of the Freedom of Information Act defining 
“agency” to include the Executive Office of the President). 











APA. From the currently available papers of the Justices, it appears that the 
Court did not examine the issue closely.56 Indeed, the Court easily could 
have avoided the question entirely. Instead, it held that the APA does not 
cover the President and reiterated that ill-considered holding two years later 
in Dalton v. Spector.57 Those decisions have yielded a circuit split on the 
scope of the federal courts’ authority to review the Statutory President’s 
decisions.58 
Part II explains why the Supreme Court was wrong when it held in 
Franklin that the APA does not cover the President. The text plainly 
includes the President: it defines “agency” broadly as “each authority” of 
the U.S. government and expressly exempts Congress, the courts, and the 
District of Columbia, among others, but it does not exempt the President. 
The statutory history reinforces the breadth of the text. The official 
legislative history explained that anyone with “the real power to act” is an 
agency. In addition, a major administrative reform bill that passed both 
houses of Congress in 1940 expressly exempted the President, but Congress 
abandoned that exemption in the APA.59  
Part II further explains the errors in the Court’s constitutional analysis. 
Allowing the Statutory President to make decisions that are binding on the 
public without procedural safeguards and judicial supervision undermines 
the central bargain underlying the APA and shakes the foundation upon 
which the administrative state is built. The Court also failed to recognize 
that privileges and exemptions would insulate the President’s core 
constitutional functions from the APA.60 Finally, Part II explains how times 
have changed since 1946 and even since the Court decided Franklin in 
1992. Presidents now make binding law in contexts and to an extent that 
seem not to have been anticipated.61 
Part III then provides a normative argument for overturning Franklin. To 
further the values underlying the APA’s procedural requirements—public 
participation, political accountability, transparency, deliberation, and 
uniformity—the Statutory President should be treated like any other 
congressional delegate. Subjecting the Statutory President to judicial review 
under the APA would further advance APA values and counterbalance 
Congress’s delegations of its authority. 
Part IV constructs a new model for treating the Statutory President like 
an “agency” under the APA. It traces Trump v. Hawaii from President 
 
56. See infra Part I.B & C. 
57. See infra Part I.D & E. 
58. See infra Part I.F. 
59. See infra Part II.A & B. 
60. See infra Part II.C. 












Trump’s first “travel ban” through the Supreme Court’s judgment 
upholding the third iteration of that order. Then it explains how things 
would have been different had the President been subject to the APA: the 
President would have provided advance notice of his intended policy, 
sought and considered public comments, and explained his decision; the 
administrative record would have included some presidential documents; 
and perhaps the Court would have scrutinized Trump’s stated justification 
for the policy more closely. 
Finally, the conclusion visits the question of how the Supreme Court or 
Congress could reverse Franklin. It refutes the notion that stare decisis 
would prevent the Supreme Court from changing course. Alternatively, it 
urges Congress to amend the APA to clarify that the President is an 
“agency.” In closing, this Article admonishes Congress to revisit its practice 
of delegating final decisionmaking authority to an unconstrained President. 
Failing to curb the Statutory President will further enable our nation’s 
descent into authoritarianism. 
I. FRANKLIN V. MASSACHUSETTS 
The Supreme Court in Franklin had little time and insufficient briefing 
to consider adequately the question of whether the APA covers the 
President. Its hasty decision has since spawned a circuit split on the extent 
to which federal courts may review presidential decisions. 
A. Pre-Franklin 
The APA defines the term “agency” as: 
each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or 
not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not 
include— 
(A) the Congress; 
(B) the courts of the United States; 
(C) the governments of the territories or possessions of the United 
States; 
(D) the government of the District of Columbia; 
or except as to the requirements of section 552 of this title— 
(E) agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of 
representatives of organizations of the parties to the disputes 
determined by them; 











(F) courts martial and military commissions; 
(G) military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in 
occupied territory; or 
(H) functions conferred by sections 1738, 1739, 1743, and 1744 of 
title 12; subchapter II of chapter 471 of title 49; or sections 1884, 
1891–1902, and former section 1641(b)(2), of title 50, 
appendix.62 
In 1971, the D.C. district court, citing works by Raoul Berger, Kenneth 
Culp Davis, and Louis Jaffe, stated that administrative law scholars “seem 
to be in agreement that the term ‘agency’ in the APA includes the 
President.” 63  But the court there did not decide the question. 64  Courts 
continued to display “reluctance to decide the question”65 until 1991, when 
the D.C. Circuit held in Armstrong v. Bush that “the [APA’s] textual silence, 
when read against the backdrop of the legislative history of the APA and 
the canons of construction applicable to statutes that implicate the 
separation of powers” indicates “that Congress did not intend to subject the 
President to the APA.”66 The court required “affirmative evidence that these 
issues were considered in the legislative process” and insisted that if 
Congress intended to cover the President, it should have made its intent 
clear.67 The court found insufficient evidence to meet that standard.68 
B. Briefing and Argument 
The following year, a three-judge district court in Massachusetts held 
that counting overseas federal employees in the 1990 census for the purpose 
of apportioning seats in the House of Representatives violated the APA.69 
 
62. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2018).  
63. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 761 (D.D.C. 
1971) (citing Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965, 997 (1969); 
Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness—A Postscript, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 823, 832 (1966); 
Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review II, 71 HARV. L. REV. 769, 778, 781 (1958)). But cf. Bruff, 
supra note 44, at 23–24. 
64. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 337 F. Supp. at 761. 
65. DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321, 1332 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974). In 1980, 
the D.C. district court held that the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act explicitly subjected the 
President’s decision to implement a gasoline conservation fee to section 553 of the APA. Indep. Gasoline 
Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614, 619 (D.D.C. 1980). The following year, the Puerto 
Rico district court held that the President is subject to the National Environmental Policy Act, which 
applies to “agencies” as defined in the APA. Puerto Rico v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1035, 1057–58 
(D.P.R.), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Marquez-Colon v. Reagan, 668 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1981). 
66. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Massachusetts v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 230, 268 (D. Mass.), rev’d sub nom. Franklin v. 












The district court did not discuss the question of whether the President is an 
“agency” under the APA. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties did not brief the issue fully, 
which is not surprising given the tight schedule. The federal defendants filed 
their notice of appeal on March 16, 1992.70 The parties filed opening briefs 
simultaneously on April 13, 199271 and reply briefs on April 20, 1992.72 The 
Court heard oral argument the following day and handed down its 
unanimous judgment reversing the district court on June 26, 1992.73 
The U.S. Solicitor General (SG) argued that Massachusetts’ challenge to 
the apportionment of representatives was not subject to judicial review 
under the APA. 74  The Secretary of Commerce’s census report to the 
President, he reasoned, was the only possible final agency action at issue 
and was unreviewable because it was committed to agency discretion under 
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).75 It is the President’s subsequent report to Congress 
that determines the apportionment of representatives, the SG continued, and 
that report is not subject to review under the APA either.76 The SG argued 
that “the President is not even an ‘agency’” under the APA, relying on the 
D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Armstrong v. Bush.77  
In a footnote, the Solicitor General elaborated that Title 3 of the U.S. 
Code addresses presidential functions, not Title 5, and that “[t]he term 
‘agency’ would be a peculiar way to refer to the President in any event” 
because he is the principal, not the agent.78 The 1941 report of the Attorney 
General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure,79  the SG continued, 
was “[c]onsistent with this view” in that it “distinguished the President’s 
functions from those of the agencies to which the APA would be 
addressed.”80  
The Appellees did not respond on the merits, arguing instead that the 
issue was irrelevant because “[t]he President played no apparent role in the 
decision to apportion overseas employees to states.”81  
 
70. Docket, Massachusetts v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 230, 268 (D. Mass. 1992) (No. 1:91-CV-
11234). 
71. Docket, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (No. 91-1502). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Brief for Appellants at 17, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (No. 91-1502). 
75. Id. at 17, 28. 
76. Id. at 29. 
77. Id. at 29–30. 
78. Id. at 30 n.16.  
79. See infra text accompanying note 314. 
80. Brief for Appellants at 30 n.16, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (No. 91-
1502) (citing COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 100 (1941)). 
81. Brief for Appellees at 113 n.36, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (No. 91-
1502).  











At the oral argument, then Deputy Solicitor General John G. Roberts, Jr. 
asserted repeatedly that the President is not an “agency” under the APA.82 
He contended that even if the President’s report to Congress were final, it 
would not be subject to review because the President is not an “agency” 
under the APA.83 He ended his opening argument on the point: “since there 
is no review of the President’s action under the APA, there is no review of 
his action in this case, and since his action is indispensable to harm to 
Massachusetts, the case is not justiciable.” 84  He even confronted 
Massachusetts directly by saying: “the President is not an agency subject to 
suit under the APA, and I don’t understand Massachusetts to challenge that 
submission here.”85 Neither the Commonwealth nor any Justice challenged 
Roberts on the point. 86  The Massachusetts Assistant Attorney General 
focused on the merits of the constitutional claim for his entire argument.87  
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
From the currently available papers of the Justices, including conference 
notes, memoranda, and draft opinions,88 it appears that the Court did not 
examine closely the question of whether the President is an “agency” under 
the APA. They did not discuss this precise issue at the conference on April 
24, 1992.89 A majority of the justices expressed the view that the case was 
unreviewable. 90  Justice O’Connor’s first draft of the Court’s opinion 
supporting that view, circulated on May 27, 1992, stated that “the final 
action complained of is that of the President, and the President is not an 
 
82. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, 11–13, 21, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 
(1992) (No. 91-1502). 
83. Id. at 13. 
84. Id. at 21–22. 
85. Id. at 10. 
86. See id. at 10–50. 
87. Id. at 22–50. 
88. I work on the assumption that Justice Blackmun’s file contains a complete record of the 
Court’s discussion in this case. It is of course possible that Justice O’Connor’s file, when it becomes 
public, will reveal additional judicial deliberation. Justice O’Connor’s individual case files at the Library 
of Congress will remain closed “during the service of any justice who participated in the case.” FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, A GUIDE TO THE PRESERVATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES’ PAPERS 32–33 (3d ed. 2018), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/36/Guide_to_Preservation_of_Federal_Judges_Papers
_Third_Public.pdf [https://perma.cc/HC7N-SN6X]. In addition to Justice O’Connor herself, Justice 
Thomas also participated in Franklin. See Franklin , 505 U.S. at 788. 
89. See Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes in Franklin v. Massachusetts (April 24, 














agency within the meaning of the Act.”91 Accordingly, there was no final 
agency action for the Court to review.92  
She continued: 
The President is not explicitly excluded from the APA’s purview, but 
he is not explicitly included, either. Out of respect for the separation 
of powers and the unique constitutional position of the President, we 
find that textual silence is not enough to subject the President to the 
provisions of the APA. We would require an express statement by 
Congress before assuming it intended the President’s performance of 
his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion. As the 
APA does not expressly allow review of the President’s actions, we 
must presume that his actions are not subject to its requirements. 
Although the President’s actions may still be reviewed for 
constitutionality, we hold that they are not reviewable for abuse of 
discretion under the APA.93 
That paragraph ended up in the Court’s final opinion.94 Justices Rehnquist, 
White, Scalia, and Thomas joined this part of Justice O’Connor’s opinion.95  
The remaining four justices were of the view that the Secretary’s report 
to the President was the final agency action.96 Accordingly, they saw no 
need to address the question of whether the President is an “agency” under 
the APA.97  They concurred in the judgment on the merits nonetheless, 
concluding that the Secretary had not exceeded his discretion.98  
Justice O’Connor’s opinion went on to hold against Massachusetts on 
the merits of its constitutional claim.99 All of the Justices joined that part of 
the opinion except Justice Scalia, who believed that Massachusetts lacked 
standing.100 
D. Avoiding the Issue 
The majority could have avoided the question of whether the President 
is an “agency” under the APA. It could have held that even if the President 
 
91. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Draft Opinion in Franklin v. Massachusetts 7 (May 27, 1992) 
(on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box 603, file 91-
1502). 
92. See id. 
93. Id. at 11 (citations omitted). 
94. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992).  
95. Id. at 789–90. 
96. Id. at 807 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
97. Id. at 807, 816 n.15 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
98. Id. at 807. 
99. Id. at 806 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
100. Id. at 824 (Scalia, J., concurring). 











is an “agency,” the President’s action was exempt from judicial review 
because it was committed to his discretion.101 The relevant statute required, 
and still requires, the President to  
transmit to the Congress a statement showing the whole number of 
persons in each State . . . as ascertained under the . . . decennial census 
of the population, and the number of Representatives to which each 
State would be entitled under an apportionment of the then existing 
number of Representatives by the method known as the method of 
equal proportions . . . .102  
In her memorandum accompanying the initial draft of the majority opinion, 
Justice O’Connor explained that she believed that the President had some 
discretion, and thus there was no final agency action.103 In other words, the 
Secretary’s report could not be considered final because the President 
retained discretion to determine “what ‘the census’ ultimately says.”104  
Justice O’Connor’s initial draft of the majority opinion, however, took a 
different tack. After stating that the President is not an agency, Justice 
O’Connor went on to state in the alternative that the census report was 
committed to the Secretary’s discretion and thus unreviewable under the 
APA.105 
Ultimately, the majority opinion followed the reasoning in Justice 
O’Connor’s memo. It emphasized that while the apportionment calculation 
is ministerial, under the statute, the President retains discretion to steer the 
policy judgments underlying the census.106 Thus, the President’s report to 
Congress was the final action, not the Secretary’s report to the President.107  
Justice O’Connor could have said that regardless of whether the 
President is an “agency” or not, the final decision was unreviewable because 
it was committed to the President’s discretion.108 That would have enabled 
the Court to reach the same judgment without deciding whether the 
President is an “agency” under the APA. One might quibble with the extent 
to which the statute cabins the President’s discretion, but certainly that 
 
101. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1988). 
102. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (2018); 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (1988). 
103. Memorandum from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor on Draft Opinion in Franklin v. 
Massachusetts to The Chief Justice (June 5, 1992) (on file with Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Box 603, file 91-1502). 
104. Id. 
105. Compare id. with Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, supra note 91 (draft opinion manuscript at 
11) (“Even if we were to conclude that the Secretary’s report to the President is a ‘final agency action’ 
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 704, the Secretary’s decision to use home of record data to allocate 
overseas employees to the various States for apportionment purposes could not be reviewed under the 
APA, because it is ‘committed to agency discretion’ within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).”). 
106. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 799 (1992). 
107. Id. 












would have been a sounder rationale than the one the Court actually relied 
upon—that the President is not an “agency.” 
Justice O’Connor may have thought that holding that the census was 
committed to the President’s discretion would have made it difficult to 
allow judicial review of Massachusetts’s constitutional claim. If so, she was 
mistaken. In the federal appellants’ reply brief, the SG argued that because 
the census is purely discretionary, there could be no judicial review of 
Massachusetts’ statutory or constitutional claims.109 The SG distinguished 
Webster v. Doe,110 where the Court held that a Central Intelligence Agency 
employee who was fired for being gay could not challenge his discretionary 
dismissal under the APA but could challenge it under the Constitution.111 
The instant case was different, the SG argued, because Massachusetts’ 
constitutional claim was identical to its statutory claim.112  
In fact, Massachusetts’ constitutional claim differed from its statutory 
claim. Massachusetts argued that the apportionment decision was arbitrary 
under the APA because it was based on unreliable data; it violated the 
Constitution because even if the data was correct, apportionment must be 
based on “the current inhabitants of each State.”113 Massachusetts did not 
have the opportunity to challenge the assertion in the SG’s reply brief that 
its claims were identical because its reply brief was due the same day as the 
SG’s reply brief.114 Instead, Massachusetts simply asserted that “[t]here is 
no question that Massachusetts’ constitutional claims are judicially 
reviewable,” citing Webster. 115  The Massachusetts Assistant Attorney 
General did not take up the issue at the oral argument the next day either.116 
Justice O’Connor appears to have tried to preserve some judicial review 
of the census while simultaneously protecting the President. Her opinion for 
the Court was an attempt to thread the needle by allowing constitutional 
claims but not APA claims against the President. The Court could have 
achieved that, however, even if it had held that the census was unreviewable 
under the APA because it was committed to the President’s discretion. 
 
109. Reply Brief for Appellants at 9–10, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (No. 91-
1502). 
110. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
111. Id. at 601, 605. 
112. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–6, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (No. 
91-1502); see also Reply Brief for Appellants at 9, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (No. 
91-1502). 
113. Brief of Appellees at 34–35, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (No. 91-1502). 
114. See Docket, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (No. 91-1502). 
115. Reply Brief of Appellees at 31, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (No. 91-
1502). 
116. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–50, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (No. 
91-1502). 











Certainly, an action can be within the scope of statutory discretion but still 
violate the Constitution, as Webster itself demonstrates.117 
E. Dalton v. Specter 
Two years after Franklin, in Dalton v. Specter,118 the Court held that 
judicial review was not available for a claim challenging the closure of the 
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard under the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Act of 1990.119 As it had in Franklin, the Court in Dalton again 
failed to examine closely the question of whether the President is an 
“agency” under the APA, and it failed to take the more doctrinally sound 
approach of holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the 
President’s decision was committed to his discretion under § 701(a)(2).120 
Following Franklin, the Dalton Court held that, under the APA, the 
Secretary of Defense’s report to the President was not final, and the 
President’s ultimate decision was not reviewable because the President is 
not an “agency.”121 Again, only five justices joined this conclusion: Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, the author, with Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas. 122  The other four justices were of the opinion that the Act 
precluded judicial review entirely, and thus, it was not necessary to decide 
whether there was final agency action.123 
The Court was unanimous, however, in holding that the President’s 
decision was not reviewable for constitutionality.124 The Respondents had 
not raised a constitutional claim or named the President as a defendant.125 
Unlike in Franklin, the Respondents in Dalton alleged merely that “the 
President exceeded his statutory authority.”126  Nonetheless, the court of 
appeals had “transmuted” the APA claim into a constitutional claim, 
reasoning that “whenever the President acts in excess of his statutory 
authority, he also violates the constitutional separation-of-powers 
doctrine.”127 The Supreme Court rejected that analysis, pointing out that it 
distinguishes between claims that an officer has acted unconstitutionally 
and claims that an officer has acted outside the scope of statutory 
 
117. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988), cited in Franklin, 505 U.S. at 801. 
118. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994). 
119. Id. at 477. 
120. Id. at 462. 
121. Id. at 469–70. 
122. Id. at 463. 
123. Id. at 484 (Souter, J., concurring); see also 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (2018) (“This chapter applies 
. . . except to the extent that—statutes preclude judicial review.”). 
124. 511 U.S. at 471–76. 
125. Id. at 466, 471. 
126. Id. at 474. 












authority. 128  Thus, claims that the President has exceeded statutory 
authority, the Court held, “are not ‘constitutional’ claims, subject to judicial 
review under the exception recognized in Franklin.”129 The claim in Dalton 
was simply a statutory claim.130 
The Court went on to assume that statutory claims against the President 
“are judicially reviewable outside the framework of the APA.”131 It cited in 
support of that assumption Dames & Moore v. Regan, 132  which is an 
example of nonstatutory review.133 Nonstatutory review allows suits against 
officers of the United States for injunctive relief even without a statutory 
waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity.134 It rests on the legal 
fiction that an officer who is acting unconstitutionally or ultra vires is not 
acting on behalf of the sovereign and thus is not protected by the sovereign’s 
immunity.135 In Dalton, the Court held that nonstatutory review was not 
available because “the statute in question commits the decision to the 
discretion of the President.”136 In so holding, the Court reflected a basic 
principle of nonstatutory review: it requires violation of a clear statutory 
mandate.137 
F. Fallout 
As a result of Franklin and Dalton, the President does not have to follow 
any of the APA’s procedural mandates. When an agency issues a binding 
rule, it must publish a notice of the proposed rule, accept and consider public 
comments, and publish a final rule with a “concise general statement” of the 
rule’s “basis and purpose.” 138  The President is not bound to those 
requirements and typically does not fulfill them.139 In addition, following 
Franklin and Dalton, judicial review of presidential orders is available, but 
incomplete; the courts of appeals will not engage in APA-style arbitrary or 
capricious review.140  
 
128. Id. at 472. 
129. Id. at 473–74. 
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135. Id. at 89. 
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137. Kovacs, Revealing Redundancy, supra note 134, at 108. 
138. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2018).  
139. John M. Griesbach, Some Observations About the Turn Toward Federal Rulemaking in 
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The D.C. Circuit explained in Chamber of Commerce v. Reich141 that 
Franklin does not preclude statutory challenges to presidential decisions 
entirely.142 There the court addressed a “challenge [to] President Clinton’s 
Executive Order barring the federal government from contracting with 
employers who hire permanent replacements during a lawful strike.”143 The 
court held that it would be able to review the President’s actions for 
compliance with relevant statutes using nonstatutory review.144 Ultimately, 
the court held that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) preempted the 
executive order.145 
Similarly, a year later, Franklin did not prevent the D.C. Circuit from 
reaching the merits of a case challenging the President’s removal of a 
member of the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). 146  The 
APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply, the court held, because 
“the action that Swan complains of, his removal, was performed by the 
President, and the President is not an agency within the meaning of the 
APA.”147  Nonstatutory review was available, however, to challenge the 
legality of Swan’s removal under the NCUA Act.148 The court reviewed the 
statutory claim and rejected it.149 
The D.C. Circuit also has said that presidential orders are reviewable for 
abuse of discretion, 150  which would seem to conflict with Franklin’s 
statement that “the President’s actions . . . are not reviewable for abuse of 
discretion under the APA.”151 The D.C. Circuit appears, however, to limit 
that “abuse of discretion” review to determining whether the President has 
acted within the scope of the statutory delegation.152 The court of appeals 
has not reviewed presidential actions under an arbitrary or capricious 
standard of review like that provided in the APA.153  
In Chamber of Commerce, for example, the D.C. Circuit said that 
Dalton’s holding that presidential actions may not be reviewed for abuse of 
 
141. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
142. Id. at 1329. 
143. Id. at 1324. 
144. Id. at 1330–31.  
145. Id. at 1339. 
146. Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
147. Id. at 981 n.4; see also Alexander v. Trump, 753 F. App’x 201, 206 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(unpublished) (holding APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to the President); Zaidan 
v. Trump, 317 F. Supp. 3d 8, 21–22 (D.D.C. 2018) (same). 
148. Swan, 100 F.3d at 981 (citing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 
689 (1949); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621–23 (1963)). 
149. Swan, 100 F.3d at 988. 
150. See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2002); cf. 
Tulare Cty. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
151. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992). 
152. Mountain States, 306 F.3d at 1136. 












discretion is limited to circumstances in which a statute assigns a specific 
decision to the President with no constraint on the President’s decision.154 
The court of appeals in Chamber of Commerce held that Dalton was 
inapposite because the claim there was that the President’s action violated 
the NLRA, which did not delegate authority to the President to issue the 
challenged order.155 As mentioned above, the court held that the NLRA 
preempted the President’s order.156 Despite its statement about the court’s 
authority to review presidential actions for abuse of discretion, it did not 
engage in APA-style review, but merely analyzed whether the President had 
acted within statutory bounds. 
Similarly, Franklin also has not prevented the D.C. Circuit from 
reviewing the President’s Antiquities Act proclamations for “abuse of 
discretion,” 157  but that review has been limited to ensuring that the 
proclamations “are consistent with constitutional principles and that the 
President has not exceeded his statutory authority.”158 The Antiquities Act 
authorizes the President to declare national monuments on public lands that 
contain “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other 
objects of historic or scientific interest” and requires that the monument “be 
confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and 
management of the objects to be protected.”159 In Mountain States Legal 
Foundation v. Bush, the plaintiffs urged the court to subject the 
proclamations at issue to a “substantial evidence” standard 160  like that 
provided in the APA.161 The court followed Chamber of Commerce and 
reiterated that presidential actions are reviewable where a “statute places 
discernible limits on the President’s discretion,” and that “[c]ourts remain 
obligated to determine whether statutory restrictions have been violated.”162 
The court had no occasion to address Mountain States’ request for 
“substantial evidence” review, however, because its complaint was devoid 
of factual allegations; it presented only legal conclusions.163 Nonetheless, 
the court noted that the proclamations at issue made the requisite recitations 
 
154. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
155. Id. at 1332. 
156. Id. at 1339. 
157. See Mountain States., 306 F.3d at 1135–36 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Tulare Cty. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 
1138 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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225 (1906); see also Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 101 (2005), judgment entered, 546 U.S. 413 
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160. 306 F.3d at 1134. 
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before affirming the dismissal of the complaint.164 Thus, in the D.C. Circuit, 
Franklin and Dalton have not eliminated judicial review of presidential 
actions entirely but have constrained it considerably. 
Unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Federal Circuit will not exercise judicial 
review to ensure that the President has acted within the scope of the statutory 
delegation. 165  In Motions Systems Corp. v. Bush, 166  the Federal Circuit 
sitting en banc addressed a challenge to the President’s decision not to grant 
import relief for the domestic pedestal actuator industry under the U.S.-
China Relations Act of 2000.167 That statute empowers the President to deny 
relief if, following a recommendation from the U.S. Trade Representative, 
the President finds “that the taking of such action would have an adverse 
impact on the United States economy clearly greater than the benefits of 
such action.”168 The majority held that judicial review was unavailable to 
challenge either the Trade Representative’s recommendation or the 
President’s decision. 169  The court concluded that Motions Systems had 
presented “no colorable claim that the President exceeded his statutory 
authority.”170 Rather, Motions Systems alleged that the President’s decision 
was “without evidentiary support”171 and thus an abuse of discretion.172 
Following Dalton, the court determined that the statute gave the President 
broad, unreviewable discretion, and the Trade Representative’s 
recommendations were not final. 173  Judge Gajarsa, joined by Judge 
Newman, wrote separately, opining that “it is the judiciary’s role, and its 
duty, to review whether the President acted within the statutory 
parameters.”174 Motion Systems petitioned for certiorari, alleging that the 
Federal Circuit’s decision conflicted with the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in 
Chamber of Commerce and Mountain States,175  but the Supreme Court 
denied the petition.176  
Similarly, in Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United States,177 the Federal 
Circuit held that the President’s proclamation modifying the Harmonized 
 
164. Id.; see also Tulare Cty. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal 
for failure to state a claim). 
165. See Stack, Reviewability, supra note 43, at 1197. 
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172. Id. at 1361. 
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174. Id. at 1362 (Gajarsa, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
175. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7–8, Motion Sys. Corp. v. Bush, 549 U.S. 814 (2006) (No. 
05-1443). 
176. See Motion Sys. Corp. v. Bush, 549 U.S. 814 (2006). 












Tariff Schedule was unreviewable. 178  The relevant statute requires the 
President to determine that the International Trade Commission’s proposed 
modifications conform to U.S. treaty obligations and “do not run counter to 
the national economic interest of the United States.”179 The court held that 
the International Trade Commission’s recommendation was not final,180 and 
the plaintiff could not challenge the proclamation as beyond the President’s 
statutory authority because the statute committed the decision to the 
President’s discretion.181  
The Supreme Court’s rush to judgment in Franklin hatched a circuit 
split. The D.C. Circuit reviews presidential actions for adherence to 
statutory constraints; the Federal Circuit does not. Neither court reviews the 
President’s actions under anything resembling an arbitrary or capricious 
standard. Had the Franklin Court taken the time to examine the issues fully, 
it would have realized that the President is an “agency” under the APA. 
II. FRANKLIN WAS WRONG 
Assuming Justice Blackmun’s file contains a complete record of the 
Court’s deliberations in Franklin, it appears that the Court, in its haste, paid 
no attention to the text and history of the APA, which indicate that the 
President should be considered an “agency.” Moreover, if the Court had 
considered the constitutional issues more closely, its concerns would have 
been allayed.182 
A. The Text 
The text of the APA should have inspired deeper deliberation in the 
Supreme Court. The plain language of the APA includes the President.183 
Section 2(a) of the APA defines “agency” broadly as “each authority 
(whether or not within or subject to review by another agency) of the 
Government of the United States other than Congress, the courts or the 
governments of the possessions, Territories, or the District of Columbia.”184 
 
178. Id. at 1340. 
179. Id. at 1342 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 3006(a)(2) (2006)). 
180. Id. at 1338. 
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Deference Playing Field, 90 OR. L. REV. 583, 617–18 (2011) [hereinafter Kovacs, Leveling], I was 
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183. See Siegel, supra note 43, at 1621 n.41 (“The Court’s holding can be criticized as a matter 
of statutory interpretation.”); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
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governmental body not expressly excluded is covered.”). 
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The President is an “authority . . . of the Government of the United 
States,”185 and is not expressly excluded from the definition, as are Congress 
and the federal courts.186 The canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
applies when “a series of two or more terms or things . . . should be 
understood to go hand in hand.”187 The President goes hand in hand with 
the other two branches of government, at least for these purposes.188 “The 
President is certainly an ‘authority’ of government and is not specifically 
excluded, so based on the APA’s text alone, the President would appear to 
be subject to its provisions.”189 
Moreover, Congress excluded some presidential functions from the 
definition of “agency.” Section 2(a) expressly exempted from the definition 
of “agency” “functions conferred by . . . the Selective Training and Service 
Act of 1940.”190 The Selective Training and Service Act delegated authority 
to the President to induct men into the armed forces under rules prescribed 
by the President.191 It also authorized the President to prescribe rules for 
deferment of service.192 Impliedly, then, other presidential functions were 
subject to the APA, unless otherwise exempted. “One might well think that 
by a powerful negative implication the President must be covered.”193 
Shortly after the Court decided Franklin, Bernard Schwartz argued that 
its approach conflicted with the typical “inclusive approach” to interpreting 
the term “agency” in the APA.194 Congress’s intent, he argued, “was to 
subject all governmental acts to APA requirements” except those explicitly 
exempted.195 Franklin thus permits the President “to violate the law where 
the violation does not raise any constitutional issue.”196 
As I argued elsewhere, the courts should hesitate to disturb the legislative 
bargain embodied in the APA.197  The APA represents an extraordinary 
moment of deliberative democracy. It followed years of debate among 
Congress, dozens of federal agencies in the Roosevelt administration, the 
 
185. Id. 
186. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2018). 
187. Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002)). 
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(2001)). 
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192. Id. § 5(c)(2), (e), 54 Stat. 888. 
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ABA, and other interested parties.198 The Supreme Court participated in the 
deliberative conversation too, providing guidance as to what form of 
regulation would pass constitutional muster.199 The text that arose from that 
exceptional legislative effort deserves respect.200 Thus, in the very least, the 
APA’s text should have given the Franklin Court pause. 
I also have argued, however, that ongoing congressional deliberation can 
influence the meaning of the APA’s original text. 201  Later Congresses 
arguably acted on the premise that the President is not an agency under the 
APA. In 1974, when Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA),202 it borrowed the APA’s definition of “agency,” but “expanded” 
the definition “to include those entities which may not be considered 
agencies under section 551(1).”203 In particular, Congress specified that it 
“includes any executive department, military department, Government 
corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in 
the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of 
the President), or any independent regulatory agency.”204 Acting Assistant 
Attorney General Malcom D. Hawk objected that imposing FOIA on the 
President’s staff would violate separation of powers and undermine the 
ability of the “President’s most trusted advisors . . . to speak candidly on 
highly confidential matters.” 205  In response, the Conference Report 
specified that “the President’s immediate personal staff or units in the 
Executive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the President” 
are not agencies under FOIA.206  
In 1976, in the Government in the Sunshine Act (Sunshine Act), 
Congress contrasted the President with agencies. The Sunshine Act 
borrowed FOIA’s definition of “agency” but specified that the new 
provisions applied only to agencies “headed by a collegial body composed 
of two or more individual members, a majority of whom are appointed to 
such position by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.”207  
 
198. See generally George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act 
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Congress’s treatment of the President in FOIA does not necessarily 
negate coverage under the rest of the APA.208 Nor does the decision to apply 
the Sunshine Act only to bodies with a majority of presidential appointees. 
If one considers post-enactment legislative treatment relevant to statutory 
interpretation, however, those decisions weaken the textual argument that 
the President is an “agency” under the APA. 
B. The History 
To understand the APA’s text, we also must examine the statutory 
history and full context.209  Although there is not much material in the 
historic record about the President, the history shows that Congress intended 
to define “agency” broadly. This history should have raised an eyebrow and 
inspired the Franklin Court to examine the question of whether the 
President is an “agency” more closely.  
A major administrative-reform bill that passed both houses of Congress 
before the APA expressly exempted the President. Congress began 
exploring administrative reform in earnest in 1939.210 That year, Senator 
Logan and Representative Cellar introduced a bill drafted by the American 
Bar Association’s Special Committee on Administrative Law. 211  When 
Congressman Walter reintroduced the bill a few month later, it came be 
known as the Walter-Logan bill.212 The bill would have required agencies 
to issue rules within one year of the enactment of any new statute.213 Rules 
would by definition be issued by “officers in the executive branch,”214 and 
the term “administrative officers” included “officers and employees in the 
executive branch, except the President of the United States.”215 The Walter-
Logan bill passed both houses of Congress in 1940, but President Roosevelt 
vetoed it in part because he first wanted to see the report of the committee 
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he had asked the Attorney General to form to study administrative reform.216 
(I will return to the Attorney General’s Committee later.217) 
Congress broadened the definition of “agency” in the bill that became 
the APA to encompass “those who have the real power to act.”218 The initial 
versions of the bill defined agency as “each office, board, commission, 
independent establishment, authority, corporation, department, bureau, 
division, institution, service, administration, or other unit of the Federal 
Government other than Congress, the courts, or the governments of the 
possessions, Territories, or the District of Columbia.”219  Congress later 
pared down the definition to “each authority . . . of the Government of the 
United States other than Congress, the courts, or the governments of the 
possessions, Territories, or the District of Columbia.”220 
The House report on the bill explained that “agency” “is defined by 
excluding legislative, judicial, and territorial authorities and by including 
any other ‘authority’ whether or not within or subject to review by another 
agency.”221 It continued:  
Whoever has the authority is an agency, whether within another 
agency or in combination with other persons. In other words, 
agencies, necessarily, cannot be defined by mere form such as 
departments, boards, etc. If agencies were defined by form rather than 
by the criterion of authority, it might result in the unintended 
inclusion of mere “housekeeping” functions or the exclusion of those 
who have the real power to act.222 
The new definition, as explained by the House report, is plainly broad 
enough to cover the President. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee Print of June 1945 explained that 
“agency” “is defined substantially as in the Federal Reports Act of 1942 . . 
. the Federal Register Act [of 1935] . . . and the Federal Register 
Regulations.”223 The definition of “agency” in the Federal Register Act 
expressly included “the President of the United States,”224 as did the Federal 
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Register regulations. 225  Seven years later, in the Federal Reports Act, 
Congress defined “agency” broadly enough to encompass the President; it 
included “any executive department, commission, independent 
establishment, corporation owned or controlled by the United States, board, 
bureau, division, service, office, authority, or administration in the 
executive branch of the Government.”226 While it did not expressly include 
the President, it did not expressly exclude the President either, as it did the 
General Accounting Office and the governments of the District of Columbia 
and U.S. territories.227 
The only discussion in the statutory history that is directly on point came 
during a House Judiciary Committee hearing in June 1945. Interstate 
Commerce Commissioner Clyde B. Aitchison said that he would prefer a 
“more precise” definition of “agency” than the one in the bill that became 
the APA.228 To demonstrate its inaccuracy, he asked whether the President 
is an agency.229  Representative John Jennings, Jr., a Republican lawyer 
from Tennessee, answered: “Well, if it operates to forbid the President from 
operating as a legislative agency, I would say it is good law.”230  
Following the APA’s enactment, the Attorney General issued a 
monograph interpreting the new Act. The Attorney General’s Manual on 
the Administrative Procedure Act seems to assume that all executive branch 
entities are “agencies.”231 It states that the APA “applies to every authority 
of the Government of the United States other than Congress, the courts, the 
governments of the possessions, Territories, and the District of 
Columbia.” 232  Moreover, when discussing the exemption from judicial 
review for actions that are “committed to agency discretion,”233 the Manual 
gives as an example “of such unreviewable agency action” the Tariff Act, 
which delegates authority to the President, thus implying that the President 
is an agency.234 
In sum, there is ample historic support for reading the definition of 
“agency” according to its plain language as including the President. 
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C. Constitutional Concerns 
The Court in Franklin rushed to judgment. In its haste, the court allowed 
constitutional avoidance to run amok. Rather than examine the APA closely, 
which might have required resolving separation of powers issues, the Court 
punted; it required an express statement from Congress to subject the 
President to judicial review under the APA.235 Yet, the Court preserved 
judicial review of constitutional claims.236 Ironically, then, Franklin is an 
exemplar of constitutional avoidance that requires courts to deny review of 
statutory claims but address constitutional claims against the President.  
If the Court had taken the time to examine the issues in Franklin more 
closely, it might have realized that exempting the President from the 
definition of “agency” raises its own constitutional concerns. It also might 
have realized that its unexamined concerns about “separation of powers and 
the unique constitutional position of the President”237 were overblown. I 
argued previously that the military should be subject to the APA to same 
extent as any other agency because the Act’s plain language subjects all 
agencies to the same standard of review and its exemptions accommodate 
the separation of powers concerns with arbitrary or capricious review of 
military decisions.238 The same is true of the President. The APA’s plain 
language covers the President, and its exemptions protect core presidential 
functions sufficiently to make Franklin’s wholesale exemption of the 
President unnecessary. A President who acts pursuant to a congressional 
delegation of authority—the Statutory President239—should be treated the 
same as any other statutory delegate. 
1. Constitutional Balance  
Exempting the Statutory President from the definition of “agency” under 
the APA raises constitutional concerns. In the New Deal era, the conditions 
for the modern administrative state were set.240 Congress engineered new 
administrative mechanisms to tackle the nation’s problems.241 The Supreme 
Court responded and instructed Congress on how to write statutes in a way 
that would pass judicial muster.242 Ultimately, Congress got the message, 
and the Supreme Court accepted these new bureaucratic institutions, but 
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only on certain conditions: the governing statutes would have to provide 
“suitable procedural safeguards” and sufficient detail to guide agency 
discretion,243 and the judiciary would have to retain a “supervisory role.”244 
Thus, both administrative procedure and judicial review are “essential 
part[s] of the quid pro quo for the Court’s constitutional imprimatur on 
agency power.”245  
The basic contours of the Court’s conditions were already baked into the 
new regulatory statutes that preceded the APA. 246  The debate about 
administrative power continued, however, among liberals and conservatives 
in Congress, the President, federal agencies, the ABA, and many other 
interested parties.247 The APA represents a constitutional moment following 
years of meaningful democratic deliberation. At that moment, Congress and 
the President unanimously accepted the existence of the administrative state 
and congressional delegations of policymaking authority to executive 
branch agencies conditioned on procedural constraints and judicial 
review.248  
The Statutory President, however, is not subject to such control, thanks 
to Franklin. Re-establishing the APA’s balance is critical to maintaining our 
democracy.249 Indeed, the desire to avoid authoritarianism was one of the 
motivations for the APA. In the 1930s, Americans learned “the true 
dimensions of European totalitarianism,” and even New Deal supporters 
feared that President Roosevelt might go down that road.250 The concern 
that administrative power could foment authoritarianism permeated the 
discourse about administrative reform.251 “Congress designed the APA to 
avoid the danger that agencies would become tools of a dictatorial 
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president.”252  When the President assumes policymaking power without 
policymaking constraints, it undermines the central bargain of the APA and 
shakes the foundation upon which the administrative state is built. 
Gillian Metzger argued that “the reality of delegation” has made the 
administrative state “constitutionally obligatory.” 253  Federal agencies 
combine expert, professional, civil-service personnel with multiple 
oversight and accountability mechanisms, public participation, and 
procedural requirements.254 That complexity makes them “the key to an 
accountable, constrained, and effective executive branch.” 255  Thus, she 
argues that bureaucracy is essential for constraining presidential power.256 
Those bureaucratic constraints must reach the presidency itself when the 
President exercises statutorily delegated power. The Supreme Court in 
Franklin failed to take such concerns into consideration. 
2. APA Exceptions 
The Court in Franklin also failed to consider that the APA would not 
apply to the President’s core constitutional functions.257 The APA protects 
the President when acting as Commander in Chief in 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(G), 
which exempts from the definition of “agency” “military authority 
exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory.”258  As I 
explained elsewhere, the Commander in Chief power bears a nexus to 
combat.259  The “military authority” exemption bears a similar nexus to 
combat. It reaches any site of military operations, including areas in which 
U.S. forces are engaged in combat as well as domestic training locations 
with some connection to combat.260 Congress need not issue a declaration 
of war for combat to qualify as “time of war” under the APA exemption.261 
Moreover, the exemption should be read broadly both because it is an 
exception to a waiver of federal sovereign immunity and because a broad 
interpretation avoids separation of powers concerns about intruding on the 
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President’s power as Commander in Chief. 262  In addition, section 553 
exempts any “military . . . function” from the APA’s rulemaking 
provisions.263 Thus, whenever the President acts as Commander in Chief, 
he would be exempt from the entire APA, including its rulemaking and 
judicial review provisions. 
Presidential actions under the Treaty Clause264 would be insulated from 
the APA’s rulemaking functions under the exemption for “foreign affairs 
function[s].”265 Any presidential rule regarding an international agreement, 
international affairs, or tariffs would likely be exempted.266 
Classified information is protected as well. The public information 
requirements of section 552 do not apply to “matters that are—(1)(A) 
specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to 
be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) 
are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.”267 Courts 
review the government’s invocations of this exemption deferentially.268 
The exemptions in section 553’s rulemaking provisions might 
encompass many other presidential statements. Any statement that lacks the 
force of law constitutes a guidance document that need not go through 
rulemaking pursuant to the exemption for “interpretative rules [and] general 
statements of policy.” 269  The APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking 
procedures do not apply to matters relating to agency management or 
personnel; public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts; or rules of 
agency organization, procedure, or practice.270 Many agencies voluntarily 
waive this exemption,271 but the President could take full advantage of it. 
Section 553 also exempts agencies from notice and comment “when the 
agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief 
statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public 
procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest.” 272  Although this exemption is construed narrowly, 273  it could 
insulate presidential actions that concern public health and safety, are short 
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lived and followed promptly by agency notice-and-comment rulemaking, or 
are non-controversial,274 among others. 
Judicial review is not available to challenge agency action where the 
matter is “committed to agency discretion by law” or “statutes preclude 
judicial review.” 275  That exemption applies equally to the President. 
According to the Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative 
Procedure Act, the exemption for matters “committed to agency discretion” 
covers presidential actions under the Tariff Act, which delegates decisions 
to the President’s judgment.276 “After 9/11, lower courts have sometimes 
applied the ‘committed to agency discretion’ exception quite capaciously in 
national security contexts.”277  Thus, this exemption would insulate core 
presidential functions from judicial review under the APA. 
Indeed, the presidential decisions in Franklin and Dalton might have 
been exempt from judicial review under this provision. Franklin concerned 
the President’s report to Congress of the States’ population according to the 
census and the apportionment of Representatives.278 The Franklin majority 
held that the statute requiring that report imposed no constraint on the 
President’s report.279 Thus, the Court in Franklin could have premised its 
judgment on the ground that the final decision was committed to the 
President’s discretion.280 Dalton concerned the Defense Base Closures and 
Realignment Act of 1990, which required the President to approve or 
disapprove of the Commission’s recommendations.281 Again, the Court held 
that “the Act . . . does not by its terms circumscribe the President’s 
discretion.”282  The Dalton Court followed Franklin in holding that the 
President’s decision was not reviewable under the APA.283 It went on to 
hold that his decision was not otherwise reviewable because it was 
committed to his discretion.284 
Therefore, the APA itself would protect core presidential functions from 
the APA’s rulemaking and judicial review provisions. Had the Franklin 
Court recognized this, it may not have written a presidential exemption into 
the APA. 
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The presidential communications privilege should have further 
alleviated the Supreme Court’s concerns about applying the APA to the 
President. The privilege applies when the President is the decisionmaker.285 
It is designed to free the President “and those who assist him . . . to explore 
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to 
do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.”286 
The presidential communications privilege, however, is not absolute.287 
Rather, the courts must balance the President’s need for confidential 
conversations against other values and “in light of our historic commitment 
to the rule of law.”288 By the same token, Congress may determine that other 
values outweigh the privilege in the domestic policy arena.289  
Even where the presidential communications privilege does not apply, 
the deliberative process privilege protects federal officers from disclosing 
certain information. Judicial review of final agency action is limited to the 
administrative record, that is, anything the decisionmaker considered in 
reaching a final decision. 290  Documents that reflect pre-decisional 
deliberation may be protected under the deliberative process privilege,291 
which is incorporated into FOIA’s exemption 5. 292  These materials 
constitute part of the give and take in the agency before the final decision 
and reflect the opinion of the writer, not the decisionmaker, on matters of 
law or policy.293 In other words, the privilege protects material that was 
produced as part of the decisionmaking process but was not incorporated 
into the final decision.294 It aims to encourage frank discussion and avoid 
misleading the public about the rationale for the agency’s final decision.295 
Michael Ray Harris argued that the deliberative process privilege should 
not apply in APA cases because it undermines judicial review of the “whole 
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record” and “hard look” review.296 He explained that President Eisenhower 
first invoked it to avoid providing sensitive military information to Senator 
McCarthy.297 It made its first appearance in a U.S. court in 1958,298 then 
“spread like ‘wildfire.’” 299  Harris argued that the privilege undermines 
transparency and enables agencies to hide evidence that they acted for 
reasons outside their authority. 300  He further argued that the privilege 
undermines the balance struck in the APA between legislative and executive 
power301 by allowing the executive branch to “frustrate judicial review” and 
“cover up decisions that are being made largely on political grounds.”302 
Courts are split on whether deliberative process materials must be 
included in administrative records in APA cases. 303  The APA of 1946, 
however, did not require agencies to develop a rulemaking record at all,304 
much less one that includes privileged documents. I explained elsewhere 
how requiring agencies to produce administrative records in informal 
rulemaking contradicts the text and history of the APA.305 In addition, given 
that “FOIA may provide for greater public access to agency records than the 
records an agency properly designates as the administrative record,”306 it 
seems awkward to require agencies to include documents that do not need 
to be released under FOIA in their administrative records.307 For purposes 
of this discussion, it suffices to say that, under current law, even if the 
presidential communications privilege were not applicable, the deliberative 
process privilege would protect a President to the same extent as any other 
officer. 
 
* * * 
 
If the Court had examined the text, history, and constitutional issues 
more closely, it would have realized that, in the very least, the question of 
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whether the President is an “agency” under the APA is a close one. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have made a deliberation-inducing 
decision to bounce the ball into Congress’s court on this issue by holding 
that the President is an agency. William Eskridge and John Ferejohn argued 
that “important shifts of a constitutional magnitude ought not to be made 
without deliberation that is open and public; reasoned and factual; and 
legitimate.”308 Thus, when the President is “skirting the constitutional edge” 
or undermining fundamental norms, Eskridge and Ferejohn suggested that 
judicial review should invite further public deliberation “by effectively 
remanding cases to the political branches.”309 
On a practical level, holding in favor of the President in Franklin and 
Dalton denied Congress the opportunity to weigh in on the extent to which 
presidential policymaking should be procedurally or judicially 
constrained.310 As Kevin Stack explained, “when the Court sustains a sitting 
President’s claim of statutory powers, . . . it effectively requires a 
congressional supermajority to overturn. In contrast, when the Court 
invalidates the President’s assertion of statutory powers, Congress does not 
face a supermajoritarian obstacle to overriding the Court’s 
determination.”311 By exempting the President from the APA, the Supreme 
Court effectively robbed Congress of the chance to legislate on this issue. 
D. Changed Circumstances 
Circumstances have changed since Congress enacted the APA in 1946 
and even since the Supreme Court decided Franklin v. Massachusetts in 
1992. Now Presidents use exclusively statutory powers to take actions that 
have enormous impacts on the public. 312  Yet, the Statutory President 
bypasses the procedural constraints and judicial oversight that 
counterbalance statutory delegations to agencies. The need to overturn 
Franklin has taken on increased urgency.313 
When Congress debated and passed the APA, it did not anticipate that 
presidential rulemaking would grow to the extent that it has. The Attorney 
General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure submitted its report on 
January 22, 1941, about a month after Congress failed to override President 
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Roosevelt’s veto of the Walter-Logan Bill. 314  As noted above, the SG 
argued in Franklin that the AG’s Committee Report distinguished the 
President from agencies.315 While true, that assertion was incomplete. The 
Committee appears not to have contemplated that the President might act 
like an agency outside the context of emergencies. 
The AG’s Committee report explained that Congress sometimes gives 
the President extraordinary rulemaking authority “to deal with emergency 
situations and often the determination of high matters of State.”316  The 
character of such situations, the Committee opined, makes normal agency 
rulemaking procedures “inapplicable.”317 When some powers that Congress 
initially authorized for “exceptional situations” were later “authorized for 
more frequent routine use,” those changes were accompanied by a change 
in procedure. 318  The “exceptional” powers that were not assigned to 
agencies, the Committee continued, “remain extraordinary and will not be 
further considered here.”319  
The AG’s Committee report included proposed bills from the liberal 
majority and the conservative minority.320 Neither of the recommended bills 
would have covered the President—at least, it would have been awkward to 
read them as covering the President. The majority bill would have defined 
“agency” with reference to “any department, board, commission, authority, 
corporation, administration, independent establishment, or other 
subdivision of the executive branch.” 321  The minority bill would have 
defined “agency” similarly: “each office, board, commission, independent 
establishment, authority, corporation, department, bureau, division, or other 
subdivision or unit of the executive branch.” 322  The President is an 
“authority” of the government but is not a “subdivision” of the executive 
branch. Thus, it appears that no one on the Committee expected the 
President to issue rules outside the context of emergencies. 
Now Presidents do so regularly.323 Lisa Manheim and Kathryn Watts 
observed that there has been “a massive transfer of policymaking authority 
from the legislative branch to the executive branch, coupled with 
increasingly aggressive attempts by presidents to control that 
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policymaking.”324 Now “separation-of-powers principles cut not only in the 
direction of protecting the president,” but also “in the direction of . . . 
ensur[ing] that [the president] remains within legal limits.”325 This shift in 
the balance of powers demands a new look at the President’s status under 
the APA. 
To summarize, the Supreme Court in Franklin erred in holding that the 
President is not an “agency” under the APA. Its hasty decision conflicted 
with the plain language and history of the statute, both of which indicate 
that Congress intentionally defined “agency” broadly—broadly enough to 
encompass the Statutory President. Moreover, had the Court taken the time 
to consider the constitutional issues, it would have concluded that 
exempting the Statutory President from the definition of “agency” 
dangerously upsets our constitutional balance. It also would have realized 
that its separation of powers concerns were exaggerated. In short, Franklin 
was wrong, and the time has come to reverse it. 
III. FRANKLIN SHOULD BE OVERTURNED 
Strong normative arguments support overruling Franklin and treating the 
Statutory President like an “agency.” The values underlying the APA’s 
procedural requirements include public participation, political 
accountability, transparency, deliberation, and uniformity.326 To advance 
those values, the President, when acting pursuant to statutorily delegated 
power, should be held to the APA’s procedural requirements. The Statutory 
President also should be held accountable in court on the same terms as any 
other statutory delegate; judicial review further advances the APA’s values 
and helps to counterbalance congressional delegations of authority.327 
A. Procedure 
Like any other “agency,” the Statutory President’s binding statements 
should be subject to the rulemaking provisions in section 553 of the APA. 
Stack argued that the President’s statutory actions should receive Chevron 
 
324. Manheim & Watts, supra note 43, at 1810. 
325. Id. 
326. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 697 (2000); 
Kimberly N. Brown, Public Laws and Private Lawmakers, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 615, 636 (2016); Evan 
J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. 
REV. 117, 123 (2011); Knowles, supra note 266, at 929; Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative 
Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1309 (2012). 
327. Judicial review is not always available to challenge agency action. See, e.g., Kovacs, Scalia’s 
Bargain, supra note 200, at 1182 (arguing that the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity applies only to 
APA claims and is subject to the other limitations in the APA); Thomas W. Merrill, Delegation and 
Judicial Review, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 80 (2010) (“Congress is not required to provide for 












deference.328 In the course of that argument, he implied that it is unnecessary 
to impose additional procedure in the context of statutory delegations of 
authority to the President 329  because “the president’s political 
accountability, visibility, ability to coordinate policy, and the transparency 
of presidential orders” are as effective as “formal procedural constraints.”330 
I disagree. Recent Presidents have abused their statutory authorities. 
Applying APA procedures to the Statutory President could go a long way 
towards avoiding authoritarianism.331 
1. Public Participation 
Among the APA’s core values is public participation.332 The Attorney 
General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure believed that allowing 
the public to participate in agency rulemaking would improve the quality of 
agency decisions and protect private interests.333 The Committee explained 
that, unlike a legislature, agencies are not representative bodies; they are 
experts in a given field. 334  However, their “knowledge is rarely 
complete.” 335  Their decisionmaking procedures, therefore, “should be 
adapted to giving adequate opportunity to all persons affected to present 
their views, the facts within their knowledge, and the dangers and benefits 
of alternative courses” to ensure that agency decisions are “fair and 
intelligent.” 336  The Senate Judiciary Committee echoed the Attorney 
General’s Committee Report, stating that [p]ublic participation “in the 
rulemaking process is essential in order to permit administrative agencies to 
inform themselves and to afford safeguards to private interests.” 337 
Congress pursued the value of public participation in the APA itself by 
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requiring agencies to provide public notice of their proposed rules and an 
opportunity for the public to comment. 338  These procedures locate 
rulemaking among “the most open and deliberative of any processes in 
American federal governance.”339 
Development of executive orders and other presidential statements, in 
contrast, often involves no public input.340 Like an agency, the Statutory 
President needs that feedback to ensure that their decisions are “fair and 
intelligent.”341 Moreover, the political nature of the presidency may incline 
Presidents to a biased view of the facts. Public input can “counter 
questionable presidential factual assertions.”342 The next section debunks 
the argument that presidential elections give the President all the feedback 
they need. 
2. Political accountability 
In her seminal article, Presidential Administration, then-Professor Elena 
Kagan argued that presidential involvement in agency policymaking 
enhances accountability by establishing an “electoral link between the 
public and the bureaucracy, increasing the latter’s responsiveness to the 
former.”343 Other scholars assert that the President’s electoral accountability 
legitimizes agency decisionmaking.344 Along the same lines, Stack asserted 
that the President’s decisions face a “greater political check” than those of 
agencies.345 That political accountability, he contended, obviates the need 
for procedural constraints in presidential decisionmaking, at least with 
regard to Chevron deference.346  
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Political accountability via presidential elections, however, is not 
sufficient.347 Presidential elections are held only every four years; a fraction 
of the population votes; and a candidate need not win the popular vote to 
become President.348 Between elections and after a President is reelected, 
“the electorate has few effective tools to hold presidents accountable for 
even the most disastrous regulatory failures.”349 Moreover, numerous issues 
clog the agenda in federal elections.350 Voters often do not know about 
regulatory issues, much less understand them,351 and most cast their votes 
based on “factors such as experience and temperament” rather than policy 
issues.352 Even voters who are sensitive to regulatory policy issues may have 
to compromise their positions on those issues “to advance other deeply held 
commitments.”353 In any event, even if a majority preference on a particular 
regulatory issue is discernable, the President has no obligation to follow 
it. 354  Interest groups may sway Presidents while in office, especially 
because elections are so expensive.355 Thus, the President is not politically 
accountable to the people via elections in a meaningful way.356 
Agencies are more accountable to the people than the President,357 in part 
because of the APA. “[T]he openness of agency decision making to public 
scrutiny . . . is itself a guarantee of public accountability.”358 Bressman and 
Vandenbergh demonstrated that, in rulemaking, agencies are more 
responsive to the public than the White House is because agencies “gather 
more public input and receive more public scrutiny, both of which tend to 
ensure that they will better assess public preferences and resist parochial 
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pressures.” 359  Thus, APA procedures may produce more political 
accountability than presidential orders.360 
In addition to the public notice and comment requirements discussed 
above,361 the APA requires agencies to provide a concise general statement 
of a rule’s basis and purpose.362 Although the agency’s explanation for its 
rule need not be elaborate, 363  this requirement enables political 
accountability.364 Absent an explanation, accountability withers. Even if 
accountability via presidential elections were sufficient, it is difficult for 
voters to judge the Statutory President at the ballot box without an 
explanation for presidential decisions. Furthermore, if the President does 
not explain the rationale for an action, there is little chance of ensuring that 
the President’s decision satisfies the minimum rationality required of 
government action. 365  Thus, the Statutory President should provide an 
explanation for their decision, just as any Secretary would.366  
3. Transparency 
Agency accountability and public participation require transparency. 
“[D]isclosing how and why [the government] makes decisions”367 enables 
the public to assign “blame or credit.”368 Not surprisingly, transparency is 
among the APA’s central values.369  
One way the APA pursues transparency is through publication 
requirements. The Federal Register Act of 1935 required agencies to publish 
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their substantive regulations.370  The APA expanded that requirement to 
cover rules of agency organization and procedure, as well as policy 
statements and interpretations.371  
A second method of pursuing transparency is through administrative 
records. The APA itself does not require agencies to produce a record or 
docket in informal rulemaking.372 Nonetheless, courts require agencies to 
produce an administrative record of material the decisionmaker considered 
in reaching a final decision.373 The administrative record enables public 
participation in the rulemaking, and it constitutes “the body of information 
the agency relies on in promulgating its final rule,” which is then subject to 
judicial review.374 
Kagan argued that presidential administration “enhances 
transparency”375 insofar as it enables the public to “understand the sources 
and levers of bureaucratic action.”376 Transparency, she argued, restricts the 
President’s “freedom to play parochial interests.”377  The more open the 
President’s policymaking, the more likely it is to reflect “broad public 
sentiment.”378  
If Kagan was correct in 2001, she is no longer. Now presidential 
decisionmaking often takes place “in a black box with little to no 
transparency.” 379  The Federal Register Act required publication of any 
presidential proclamation or Executive Order that has “general applicability 
and legal effect” and is effective against the public.380 President Kennedy 
published an Executive Order laying out the process for preparing such 
proclamations and orders, which subsequent presidents have updated.381 
Unfortunately, the publication requirement did not prevent President Trump 
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from issuing his first “travel ban” without the review required by Kennedy’s 
procedural Executive Order.382 When an agency fails to adhere to its own 
procedural rules, the administrative record reveals that failure.383 Unlike an 
agency, however, the Statutory President need not reveal how they reached 
their decision, who influenced them, or what information they 
considered.384  
Nina Mendelson argued that presidential supervision of agency 
rulemaking can lend legitimacy to agency policymaking but only if it is 
transparent. 385  Presidential involvement can be either good or bad 
“depending on the content of the influence.”386 If the public does not know 
the content of presidential influence, she continued, it may not serve “as a 
source of legitimacy for the administrative state.”387  Hence, Mendelson 
suggested that White House influence be disclosed as part of the agency 
rulemaking process.388  
Similarly, for the Statutory President’s decisionmaking to be legitimate, 
it must be transparent.389 Interpreting the APA as written and treating the 
Statutory President like an “agency” would enhance that transparency. 
Where the President acts as Congress’s delegate, the administrative record 
would include documents leading up to the President’s order to the same 
extent as any other statutory delegate.390 The record should reflect who the 
President heard from, what their arguments were, and what the President 
read.391 As Thomas McGarity asserted, requiring that presidential contacts 
“be reduced to writing and placed in the administrative record would be a 
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relatively unintrusive congressional limitation on presidential 
prerogatives.”392  
In sum, all of the Statutory President’s orders and rules of procedure 
should be published and codified, and the documents the Statutory President 
considered in reaching a decision should be included in the administrative 
record, absent privilege. 
4. Deliberation 
The APA explicitly requires agencies to “consider[] . . . the relevant 
matter presented” in the rulemaking process. 393  The Supreme Court 
observed that notice-and-comment rulemaking was “designed to assure due 
deliberation.”394 It “tend[s] to foster the fairness and deliberation that should 
underlie a pronouncement” that is legally binding on the public.395 Indeed, 
rulemaking may be “the most open and deliberative of any processes in 
American federal governance.”396  
The public interest demands that agency decisions reflect deliberation, 
not raw politics. 397  Peter Shane posited that “our best instrument for 
elevating public interest over faction” is “an extended democratic 
conversation during which multiple interests and perspectives are brought 
to bear and momentary passions are perhaps cooled with time for 
reflection.”398 That sort of open process results in “wiser” decisions.399 As 
Thomas McGarity observed, “There is little reason . . . to believe that 
interjecting ad hoc, overtly political considerations will result in sounder 
rules.”400 
Agency decisions are expected to be based on expertise, not politics. 
Expertise is the rationale for assigning different problems to different 
agencies. 401  Those subject-matter delegations give agencies “unique 
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institutional advantages—to address a set of problems with expert, 
nonpolitical decision making.”402 
Presidents, in contrast, are political actors; they generally evaluate 
policies from a political perspective, making them “inherently non-
deliberative.”403 Greater presidential control yields less deliberation within 
the Executive Branch. 404  It “tends to short-circuit or undercut the 
deliberative processes that make agency decisionmaking democratically 
accountable.”405 Peter Shane minced no words in asserting that “the growth 
of executive power is all too likely to produce dysfunctional government”; 
it “breeds an insularity, defensiveness, and even arrogance within the 
executive branch that undermines sound decision making, discounts the rule 
of law, and attenuates the role of authentic deliberation in shaping political 
outcomes.”406 
Furthermore, Presidents lack expertise.407 They may not be competent to 
“identify and understand the trade-offs” in complex policy decisions.408 
Kevin Stack reasoned that the President’s lack of expertise is not a problem, 
because a President may call on experts in agencies to assist in 
decisionmaking.409 Unfortunately, in recent years, Presidents have not done 
this with sufficient regularity.410 
Treating the Statutory President like an agency under the APA would 
force the President to consider alternative positions and solutions. It would 
combat the inherently political, non-deliberative nature of presidential 
decisionmaking, hopefully yielding sounder policies.411 
5. Uniformity 
Finally, one of Congress’s central purposes in enacting the APA was to 
impose some uniformity on administrative procedure.412 Congress aimed to 
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make dealing with administrative agencies less confusing and more fair.413 
Accordingly, in the APA, Congress abandoned the Walter-Logan Bill’s 
approach of exempting particular agencies and opted instead to “deal with 
types of functions as such.”414 The APA was “meant to be operative ‘across 
the board.’”415  The broad definition of “agency” reflects that desire for 
uniformity.416  
Uniformity carries a strong normative valence in both procedure417 and 
judicial review.418 Hence, when the Franklin Court inserted an exemption 
for the President into the definition of “agency,” it undermined one of the 
APA’s core normative commitments. The President acting as Congress’s 
statutory delegate should be subject to the same requirements as any other 
statutory delegate.  
6. Objections 
Some might object that applying the APA’s procedural requirements to 
the President would impose an unacceptable burden on the office. That 
objection holds no water. First, if the APA is read properly, its requirements 
are quite reasonable. The rulemaking provisions of the APA, for example, 
are bare bones, so applying them to the President would not be onerous.419 
Second, employees in the Executive Office of the President would do the 
work. 420  The President’s only real additional obligations would be to 
deliberate and explain—obligations that seem quite reasonable given the 
gravity of the decisions Congress has delegated to the Statutory President. 
Third, the APA’s exceptions, if interpreted properly, provide the flexibility 
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the President needs to remain effective. 421  In this regard, the Statutory 
President is like any other agency: effective governance requires some 
flexibility.422  
If the APA’s procedures are too burdensome for the Statutory President, 
then Congress should rethink statutory delegations to the President. For any 
part of the Executive Branch to make binding policy decisions without the 
transparency, public participation, and deliberation the APA generates is 
deeply problematic. Thus, many of the APA values discussed above 
challenge the wisdom of statutory delegations to the President entirely.  
B. Judicial Review 
Subjecting the Statutory President to judicial review under the APA 
would further advance the values discussed above. In addition, it would 
ensure that the President acts within the scope of statutory authority and that 
their decisions are reasonable and consistent with the record. 
1. Under the APA 
To the Congresses that developed the APA in the 1930s and 1940s, 
judicial review of administrative action was vital to protect individual 
liberties and avoid administrative overreach. 423  The totalitarianism 
sweeping Europe at the time inspired administrative reform in the U.S.424 
Many Americans feared Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s dictatorial tendencies 
and did not trust government agencies to protect their interests.425 Rather, 
Americans expected the federal courts to stem the tide of totalitarianism.426 
Allowing agencies to take action with the force of law without erecting 
judicial review as a backstop was viewed as approaching totalitarianism.427 
Judicial review also helped to counterbalance delegations to agencies.428 
Early in the New Deal era, the Supreme Court struck down regulatory 
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schemes for unconstitutionally delegating authority to agencies.429 Daniel 
Rodriguez and Barry Weingast explained recently that the Supreme Court 
in those and other cases provided Congress with a “how-to manual” for 
delegating authority to agencies.430 Providing for judicial review of agency 
action was one of the Supreme Court’s conditions for ending its assault on 
regulatory statutes under the non-delegation doctrine.431 
One function of judicial review, then, is to ensure that agencies act within 
the scope of their authority.432 Public actors must have legal authorization 
for their actions; they have only limited powers, and the federal courts may 
police the boundaries of legal authorization.433 Kevin Stack asserted that, if 
the constitutional minimum in Article III requires a federal court to be 
available to consider issues of federal law, that must include “review of the 
scope of authorization granted by statute.”434 
The APA’s judicial review provisions, however, extend beyond ensuring 
that agencies act within the limits of their statutory authority.435 The APA 
instructs courts to set aside agency action that is “not in accordance with 
law,” as well as agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of 
discretion.”436 In other words, under the APA, courts review not just the 
existence of agency authority, but also the exercise of that authority.437 In 
the New Deal era, the Supreme Court allowed Congress to delegate 
authority to agencies on the condition that courts could ensure that those 
agencies exercised reasoned decisionmaking.438 Of course, application of 
the arbitrary or capricious standard has drifted over the years from its 
original conception of ensuring a “minimally rational basis” for agency 
action to “hard look” review.439 Nonetheless, the inclusion of the arbitrary 
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or capricious standard in the APA indicates some intention to extend 
judicial review beyond ensuring that agencies act “in accordance with 
law.”440 Scholars view this extended form of judicial review as one of the 
key mechanisms for ensuring agency accountability.441  
2. Of the Statutory President 
Yet, the Statutory President does not face that form of judicial review. 
Judicial review of the Statutory President’s actions is available, but it is 
flawed.442 As explained above, some federal courts are willing to ensure that 
the President has acted within the scope of statutory and constitutional 
authority.443 Beyond that, however, the Statutory President’s actions are not 
reviewable. As William Yeatman explained with regard to President 
Trump’s decision to redirect military construction funds to build a wall 
between the U.S. and Mexico, “courts won’t scrutinize the president’s 
decision that a ‘national emergency’ exists. Nor will courts perform a 
meaningful inquiry of the relationship between the putative national 
emergency and the border wall. That is, they won’t question if the wall is a 
reasonable policy to mitigate the supposed national emergency.”444 
The Statutory President’s actions should be reviewed under the same 
standard as any other statutory delegate.445 Plainly, the APA’s text provides 
no exemption for the President.446 Indeed, members of Congress on both 
sides of the aisle agreed that the judicial review provisions should apply to 
all agencies uniformly.447  Uniformity was among their central goals in 
enacting the APA.448 
Furthermore, Congress is incapable of policing the Statutory President; 
hence, judicial intervention is critical.449 Our commitment to judicial review 
as a means of ensuring administrative accountability must extend to the 
President when acting pursuant to a statutory delegation.450 Thomas Merrill 
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predicted that without adequate judicial review, presidential administration 
would turn to “power politics” and result in “tragedy for our ongoing 
experiment in democratic government.”451  
Kevin Stack demonstrated that the Statutory President’s actions should 
be subject to judicial review, 452  but he advocated for review only to 
determine whether the President acted within the scope of the statutory 
delegation.453 “The core idea,” he said, “is that when the President asserts 
statutory authority, his actions must fall within the authority granted by 
statute, just like an agency.”454  
Stack was right but did not go far enough. Stack argued that the 
President’s statutory actions should be reviewed under an ultra vires 
framework from cases predating the APA.455  This would allow judicial 
review of any “issue . . . that bears on the validity of the [President’s] claim 
of authority.”456 Like any statutory delegate, though, the President may act 
within the scope of statutory authority and nonetheless act in a way that is 
arbitrary or capricious.457 Stack’s ultra vires framework does not specify a 
standard of review458 much less authorize review of the President’s actions 
for abuse of discretion or arbitrariness. 
Similarly, David Driesen advocated for judicial review of certain 
presidential actions but stopped short of endorsing full APA review. He said 
that executive orders should be reviewed under an arbitrary or capricious 
standard of review to keep the President within the bounds of the statutory 
delegation and avoid non-delegation problems. 459  He pointed out that 
judicial review is even more important for the President than for agencies 
because a President may believe that their election gave them a mandate to 
change the law.460 Thus, there is a greater risk that a President will “subvert 
an entire body of law.”461 Yet, Driesen also argued that the arbitrary or 
capricious standard should be “tailor[ed]” to reduce the risk of a court 
invalidating a presidential action improperly.462 Essentially, he contended 
that courts should be particularly deferential to the Statutory President.463 
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His version of the arbitrary or capricious standard as applied to the Statutory 
President would “detect faithless execution of the law,” but not “errors in 
judgment.”464  
In a recent American Constitution Society Issue Brief, Alan Morrison 
seemed to go further.465  He contended that judicial review of statutory 
claims against the President is needed to maintain fidelity to the rule of 
law.466 Beyond that, Morrison said “APA review could be extremely helpful 
. . . in promoting government transparency and accountability.” 467  As 
Driesen pointed out, elections can inspire Presidents to make policy based 
on the policy’s apparent popularity rather than fully informed 
consideration.468 If the Statutory President is subject to review under the 
APA, Morrison posited, “he will have to spend more time and be more 
careful with what he does and how he explains it.”469 In other words, full 
APA review of the Statutory President’s actions would inspire deliberation 
and transparency. Thus, full APA review is not only consistent with the text 
and purposes of the APA, but also furthers the norms embodied in the APA. 
Lastly, overturning Franklin v. Massachusetts would eliminate the 
confusion in the circuits about the extent to which the Statutory President’s 
actions are reviewable.470 
3. Objections 
Those who objected to applying the APA’s procedural requirements to 
the Statutory President would again object that applying the judicial review 
provisions would impose an unacceptable burden on the office of the 
President. That objection warrants the same response here. Again, it is not 
the President who would be burdened, but the Executive Office of the 
President and the Department of Justice. Thus, APA claims against the 
Statutory President would pose no unacceptable danger of distraction.471 
Moreover, the APA’s exceptions would insulate many of the Statutory 
President’s decisions from judicial scrutiny. 472  For those claims that 
proceed to judgment, the courts would retain their equitable discretion to 
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mold a remedy appropriate to the situation.473 Finally, if judicial review 
under the APA is too burdensome for the Statutory President, then perhaps 
Congress should not delegate statutory duties to the President.  
One might object that applying the APA’s judicial review provisions to 
the Statutory President is unnecessary, because a plaintiff can wait and sue 
the agency when it implements the President’s order. 474  But in such 
circumstances, the agency has no discretion to decline to follow the 
President’s order, so the decision to do so is unreviewable.475 In Sherley v. 
Sebelius,476  for example, plaintiffs challenged the National Institutes of 
Health’s (NIH) failure to respond to their comments on guidelines related 
to research using embryonic stem cells. 477  The comments, however, 
objected categorically to research using embryonic stem cells, which the 
Court recognized was contrary to President Obama’s executive order 
supporting such research.478  The Court pointed out that “NIH may not 
simply disregard an Executive Order.”479 The plaintiffs’ “comments simply 
did not address any factor relevant to implementing the Executive Order”; 
hence, ignoring them was not arbitrary or capricious.480 How the agency 
implements the order—any discretionary element of the policy—is 
reviewable, but challenging the decision itself requires the President as 
defendant.481 Moreover, suing the implementing agency is not a satisfactory 
alternative because the agency’s explanation for the policy may not reflect 
the President’s rationale; the agency may supply facts and justifications of 
which the President was not even aware. Suing the implementing agency, 
then, allows post hoc justifications; suing the President incentivizes honing 
policy ab initio. 
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One might also argue that APA review of the Statutory President is 
unimportant because nonstatutory review is already available. 482  But 
nonstatutory review is not an adequate alternative to the APA. To begin, the 
jurisprudence of nonstatutory review is muddled and confusing. 483 
Nonstatutory review is grounded on the legal fiction that an officer who is 
acting unconstitutionally or ultra vires is not acting on behalf of the 
sovereign and thus is not protected by the sovereign’s immunity. 484 
Jonathan Siegel warned that forgetting that such a legal fiction is indeed 
fiction leads to harmful results. 485  Certainly, it is preferable to rely on 
positive law, like the APA, rather than so amorphous a concept as 
nonstatutory review.486 
Furthermore, nonstatutory review is “quite narrow.” 487  First, it is 
available only where the plaintiff has no other “meaningful and adequate 
means of vindicating its statutory rights.”488 Second, it does not allow the 
court to review the exercise of discretion. Again, an officer acting outside 
the scope of their authority does not enjoy sovereign immunity. Conversely, 
an officer acting within the scope of their authority is acting for the 
sovereign and hence is protected by sovereign immunity.489 Consequently, 
nonstatutory review only opens the courthouse doors to claims alleging that 
an officer has acted outside the scope of their authority.490 Franklin was 
itself a nonstatutory review case.491  There the Court emphasized that it 
would not review the President’s action for abuse of discretion.492 “Garden-
variety errors of law or fact are not enough” either.493 Many courts require 
violation of a “clear statutory mandate” to pursue nonstatutory review.494 
Third, nonstatutory review entails no particular standard of review. In 
nonstatutory review cases against the President, then, one might expect the 
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standard of review to “be extremely generous.”495 In short, APA review of 
presidential decisions avoids the complications of nonstatutory review and 
potential bars to its use, makes it clear that review is available, and 
establishes the standard of review.  
Daphna Renan cautioned against over-reliance on judicial review to 
control Presidents effectively. 496  “Courts cannot solve the problems of 
constitutional governance,” she said, and the more we depend on them to 
do so, “the more fragile judicial norms (such as norms of judicial 
independence) may become.” 497  Peter Shane contributed that courts 
intercede in presidential decisionmaking “only episodically and are anxious 
about decision making in areas where they might lack expertise or could be 
perceived as intruding in policy making.”498 They also are keenly aware that 
their remedial power is limited.499 These points are well taken. Subjecting 
the Statutory President to judicial review under the APA, though, could 
assuage the courts’ reluctance to some degree by treating the President in 
that context like any other agency. In addition, subjecting the Statutory 
President to the APA’s procedural requirements would supplement judicial 
accountability. 
IV. THE NEW MODEL 
The prior sections made the legal and normative arguments for treating 
the Statutory President like an “agency” under the APA. This section paints 
a picture of what doing so would look like. Presidential decisions that are 
founded on delegated statutory authority and that have the force of law 
would be proceeded by publication of a draft decision, receipt and 
consideration of public comments, and publication of a final decision with 
an explanation for the decision. Judicial review would follow, employing 
an administrative record that would include some presidential documents 
and applying the arbitrary or capricious standard.500 Adhering to the APA 
may have changed both the logistics and outcome of Trump v. Hawaii 
considerably. 
A. Trump v. Hawaii 
In President Trump’s first order, issued one week after his inauguration, 
he suspended entry into the U.S. of people from certain nations for ninety 
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days.501 He did not seek public input on a draft. Indeed, he barely sought 
review within his own administration.502 The final document provided little 
explanation beyond the bare assertions that some foreign nationals commit 
terrorist acts in the U.S. and that allowing people from the identified nations 
to enter “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.”503 The 
President’s defense of that order failed.504  
The next order suspending entry of people from certain nations explained 
why “conditions in these countries present heightened threats” 505  and 
supported its assertions with information from the Departments of State and 
Justice.506 Given those circumstances, the President made the judgment that 
“the risk of erroneously permitting entry of a national of one of these 
countries who intends to commit terrorist acts or otherwise harm the 
national security of the United States is unacceptably high.”507 Lower courts 
enjoined that order, 508  but the Supreme Court stayed those injunctions 
pending review.509 
The Proclamation at issue in Trump v. Hawaii included a preamble in 
which the President explained that some countries’ deficient information-
sharing practices put the United States at risk.510 The Proclamation further 
explained in detail why information sharing is important for national 
security and how the Department of Homeland Security evaluated foreign 
countries’ information-sharing practices.511 The Proclamation tailored its 
restrictions based on the circumstances in each individual country512 and 
provided certain exceptions.513  
This time, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment enjoining the 
Proclamation. 514  The Court emphasized that the Proclamation included 
“extensive findings” supporting the President’s discretionary decision.515 
The Court thought it “questionable” whether the President had to explain 
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his determination “with sufficient detail to enable judicial review”516 but 
found the President’s explanation to be sufficiently detailed and thorough 
nonetheless. 517  The Court limited its statutory inquiry to whether the 
President acted within the scope of his authority.518 It declined the plaintiffs’ 
request to evaluate the persuasiveness of the President’s rationale, finding 
that approach “inconsistent with the broad statutory text and the deference 
traditionally accorded the President in this sphere.”519 Instead, the Court 
was satisfied with its conclusion that “the Proclamation does not exceed any 
textual limit on the President’s authority.”520 The challengers’ request for 
“the Court to probe the sincerity of the stated justifications for the policy by 
reference to extrinsic statements”521  also fell flat, because the President 
“gave a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide’ reason for [his] action.” 522 
Indeed, the President’s “stated objective” or “justification,” which the Court 
accepted at face value, was the focus of the Court’s Establishment Clause 
review and the key to the judgment upholding the order.523  
B. Next Time 
Now imagine that either the Supreme Court or Congress had overruled 
Franklin before President Trump issued the travel bans. First, 
acknowledging that the Statutory President is an “agency” under the APA 
would have required President Trump to publish notice of and accept public 
comments on his proposed policy. 524  Seeking public input up front, 
including from agencies with relevant information and expertise, may have 
resulted in a more accurate and honed policy in the first instance.525 A higher 
quality policy would have been more likely to accomplish Trump’s asserted 
national security goals. Avoiding the false starts also might have reduced 
public dissent simply by making the process more transparent and fair.526  
Second, the APA would have required the President to consider the 
public comments.527  Trump declared his intention to issue these orders 
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before the election,528 so he likely saw the election as an endorsement of his 
policy. Yet, he did not win a majority of the popular vote,529 and obviously 
there were far more issues at play in the election. Some genuine deliberation 
would have given the immigration policy some distance from raw politics 
and lent it a bit of legitimacy.530 
Third, if the APA had been applicable, Trump likely would have given 
a more robust explanation in the first order instead of needing to go through 
two failed iterations before reaching a result that ultimately satisfied the 
Supreme Court.531 The benefits of providing a better explanation would 
have merged with the benefits of providing public notice, an opportunity for 
public comment, and genuine consideration to make the initial order more 
accurate, effective, legitimate, and fair. 
Fourth, if Franklin had been overturned, the administrative record in 
Trump v. Hawaii would have included documents from the President’s 
office. Generally speaking, the administrative record should include any 
unprivileged material the decisionmaker considered in reaching a final 
decision.532 We may never know what the record would have included in 
Trump v. Hawaii. We know what would not have been included: evidence 
that Trump followed the review process required by Kennedy’s executive 
order before issuing the first travel ban. The APA would have revealed 
Trump’s procedural failure. A complete administrative record also might 
have revealed whether Trump’s stated justification for the order was 
genuine. 
Lastly, by reviewing Trump’s travel ban like any other decision of a 
statutory delegate, the Court would not have limited its inquiry to whether 
the President stated the requisite finding—that allowing people from certain 
country to enter the United States “would be detrimental to the interests of 
the United States.”533 Rather, the Court also would have examined whether 
his finding was reasonable and supported by the record.534  
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The Court might have scrutinized Trump’s stated justification for the 
policy as well. In the recent case concerning the inclusion of a citizenship 
question on the decennial census, Department of Commerce v. New York, 
the Supreme Court reiterated that while courts generally do not inquire 
about a decisionmaker’s “mental processes,” where there is a “strong 
showing of bad faith or improper behavior,” the court may order extra-
record discovery.535 There, the Court examined the available evidence and 
held that the Secretary’s rationale for his decision did not match the 
record.536 The Court insisted that agencies provide “genuine justifications 
for important decisions” to avoid turning judicial review into “an empty 
ritual.”537 If the Court had applied that rule in Trump v. Hawaii, it may have 
concluded that the explanation in the final travel ban was pretextual. 
Of course, courts are particularly solicitous of decisions based on 
national security concerns. In Trump v. Hawaii, the Court declined to 
second-guess the authenticity of the President’s justification for the travel 
ban—despite his repeated public statements indicating that it was motivated 
by animus toward Muslims 538 —because it implicated immigration and 
national security, areas in which the Court believes that it lacks institutional 
competence.539 That solicitude conflicts with the plain language and history 
of the APA.540 Congress made a deliberate decision in the APA to subject 
all agency action to the same standard of review.541 It carved out exceptions 
related to national security: the APA does not apply to courts martial or 
“military authority exercised in the field in time of war,”542 and military and 
foreign affairs functions are exempt from the rulemaking and adjudication 
provisions.543 Where those exceptions do not apply, even decisions with 
national security implications should receive no more or less deference than 
any other agency decision.544  In short, if Franklin had been overturned 
before President Trump took office, the travel ban would have been 
reviewed like any other agency order. Had it been, both the process and the 
outcome may have been very different. 
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Presidents use statutorily delegated powers to make decisions that have 
vast implications for the public. They divert billions of dollars in federal 
funds; they move international trade markets; they bar people from entering 
the country. A single person making binding policy decisions unilaterally is 
the very definition of authoritarianism.545 
This paper suggests one solution to this problem: overturn Franklin v. 
Massachusetts and treat the President like an “agency” under the APA. The 
Supreme Court could do this simply by adhering to the plain language of 
the APA. Reading the text to include the President as an “agency” finds 
support in the statutory history, it avoids constitutional concerns, and it 
advances the APA’s central values.  
Stare decisis should not hinder the Supreme Court from overturning 
Franklin. Even the “super-strong” form of stare decisis applied in statutory 
cases is not absolute. 546  For one thing, the Court overrules statutory 
precedents “when there are constitutional doubts about the statute as 
interpreted.”547 As explained above, exempting the Statutory President from 
the APA’s definition of “agency” raises serious constitutional concerns.548 
Furthermore, the Court has carved out exceptions to statutory stare decisis 
where its precedent reflects inadequate deliberation, 549  which certainly 
applies to Franklin.550 In addition, the Supreme Court often has treated the 
APA like a common law statute.551 Though I disagree with that approach,552 
it should leave the APA more open to reinterpretation.553 
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Moreover, the justifications for statutory stare decisis do not fit Franklin. 
The Court applies stare decisis more strongly in statutory interpretation 
cases partly on the premise that Congress can override such 
interpretations554: “if Congress does not amend the statute to overrule the 
statutory precedent . . . it is presumed that Congress ‘approves’ of the 
interpretation.”555 Additionally, “the Supreme Court’s refusal to revisit a 
statutory interpretation is a means of shifting policymaking responsibility 
back to Congress, where it belongs.”556 As noted above, however, when the 
Court sides with the President, the prospect of a congressional reversal is 
remote.557  
If the Court is not up to the task, Congress may overturn Franklin by 
amending the APA to clarify that the President is an “agency.” In this 
Article, I have presented the legal and normative arguments for that 
amendment. In recent decades, people on both sides of the aisle have 
objected to presidential overreach.558 There should be bipartisan support for 
my proposal. At least, it is my hope that this paper spurs discussion of the 
Statutory President’s procedures and judicial review.  
Admittedly, Congress overruling Franklin, which would entail 
overriding a likely presidential veto, seems like a long shot at this point in 
history. Some might agree with Jonathan Siegel, who opined that “the APA 
may well be too blunt an instrument to deal with particular concerns that 
apply to the President.” 559  Moreover, overturning Franklin in one fell 
swoop could subject the Statutory President to the Congressional Review 
Act 560  and the National Environmental Policy Act, 561  among others. 562 
Alternatively, then, Congress could specify which of the APA’s provisions 
apply to the President. This latter approach would force Congress to balance 
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the benefits and burdens of the APA’s various provisions in this context, 
and in the course of that analysis, perhaps consider other long-overdue 
amendments.563  
Another alternative would be for Congress to dial back its practice of 
delegating final decisionmaking authority to the President. Any such 
delegation should be conditioned on procedural requirements and adequate 
judicial review. If the President is not subject to those basic constraints, the 
President should not be delegated final decisionmaking authority. 
Regardless of how the task is accomplished, the Statutory President must be 
reined in if we are to slow our gallop towards authoritarianism. 
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